Judicial involvement in Domain Name Disputes in Canada by Campbell, R. Lynn
Revue de DROIT 
UNIVERSITÉ DE SHERBROOKE 
Titre : JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN DOMAIN NAME DISPUTES IN CANADA 
Auteur(s) : R. Lynn CAMPBELL
Revue : 
Pages : 
ISSN : 
Éditeur : 
URI : 
DOI : 
RDUS, 2003-2004, volume 34, numéro 1-2 
373-420
0317-9656 
Université de Sherbrooke.  Faculté de droit. 
http://hdl.handle.net/11143/12289 
https://doi.org/10.17118/11143/12289 
RDUS 
Page vide laissée intentionnellement. 
 
*. Professor, Department of Law, Carleton University.
ARTICLE
JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT
IN DOMAIN NAME DISPUTES
IN CANADA
par R. Lynn CAMPBELL*
Les premières oppositions aux noms de domaines étaient principalement
résolues par des demandes d'injonctions aux tribunaux. Pour obtenir ce redressement,
les opposants argumentaient que l'utilisation d'un nom de domaine enfreignait un droit
privé. Aujourd'hui, la plupart des conflits au sujet des noms de domaines sont résolus
en ayant recours à une pratique de règlement des conflits mise en place par contrat lors
de l'enregistrement des noms de domaines. Les droits des deux parties sont soupesés
soigneusement dans la politique pertinente et une décision écrite est requise lors de la
formation du panel.
Quel est le statut d'une telle décision vis-à-vis d’une intervention du tribunal
ultérieure une fois le processus de règlement extrajudiciaire des conflits achevé? Le
tribunal a-t-il la juridiction de traiter une dispute de novo en raison de l'adoption d'une
déclaration? L'application des principes traditionnels de l'attaque indirecte et de l’issue
estoppel pour une même question de droit administratif en litige n'appuient pas de novo
l'intervention judiciaire. Les principes de droit administratif pour le contrôle judiciaire
des décisions du tribunal n'appuient donc manifestement pas les interventions
judiciaires.
                        
Early domain name challenges were primarily resolved by application to the
courts for an injunction. To obtain this relief, challengers argued that the use of the
domain name infringed a private law right. Today, most current domain name disputes
are resolved by recourse to a dispute resolution policy set up by contract at the time a
domain name is registered. The rights of both parties are carefully balanced in the
relevant policy and a written decision is required of the panel. 
What is the status of such a decision after completion of the alternate dispute
resolution process vis-à-vis subsequent court intervention? Does a court have
jurisdiction to hear the dispute de novo by way of an application for declaration?
Application of traditional administrative law principles of collateral attack and issue
estoppel do not support de novo judicial intervention. Nor do the administrative law
principles for judicial review of consensual tribunal decisions clearly support court
intervention.
Judicial Involvement
374 in Domain Name Disputes (2003-04) 34 R.D.U.S.
in Canada
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375
Early Judicial Involvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375
Federal Court Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376
Provincial Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381
Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388
The New Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390
The Complaint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392
The Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394
The Panel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395
The Service Provider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397
Court Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400
Attack or Review by the Courts? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403
Collateral Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405
Application of Issue Estoppel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407
Judicial Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411
Standard of Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411
Application of Standard to Domain Name Decisions . . . . . . . . . . 413
Black v. Molson Revisited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419
Judicial Involvement
(2003-04) 34 R.D.U.S. in Domain Name Disputes 375
in Canada
Introduction
Today there are millions of domain names used in the Internet.  For
owners, a domain name may well be an integral part of their identity and be that
which distinguishes them from all others.  For others, a domain name may be the
most valuable asset of the business.  Business registrants often view a domain
name as an opportunity capable of tremendous financial benefit in the future.
Due to the global reach of the Internet, it is understandable that there are
disputes over ownership of unique domain names, particularly the ones that are
either identical or similar to registered trade-marks.  An aggrieved person,
unable to obtain and use a particular domain name, will expend deep pocket
capital to take all sorts of means to get it, including recourse to the courts.
 This paper examines the involvement that Canadian courts have had in
domain name disputes. The first part examines the early challenges of domain
name disputes in the Federal Court of Canada and the superior courts of the
provinces.  This part will focus on the granting of interlocutory injunctions,
primarily for trade-mark infringements, passing off and breach of copyright.
The second part will explore the various provisions of the Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy of the Canadian Internet Registration Authority to
determine the scope of the policy and how the rights of a complainant and
respondent are protected.  The third section reviews a recent case before the
Ontario Superior Court of Justice and explores several standards of review of
Panel Decisions under the CIRA policy.  This part demonstrates the need for
lawyers and courts to clearly articulate the grounds for and scope of judicial
review over private dispute resolution procedures involving domain names.  The
final part will make several observations in relation to the resolution of future
disputes.
Early Judicial Involvement
Recourse to the courts for resolution of domain name disputes has had
a relatively brief, but interesting, history.  Many of the cases have been heard in
the Federal Court of Canada because the cause of action is based on trade-mark
infringement.  However, passing off, breach of copyright and defamation actions
have been heard in courts of provincial jurisdiction.  Very few of these cases
have gone as far as trial.  Most plaintiffs want to quickly restrain the use of a
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1. For liability of  «use» of a trade-mark on a web site, see, Pro-C Limited v. Computer City,
Inc. (2001), 149 O.A.C. 190; 107 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1073.
2. Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. c. T-10.
3. (1997), 76 A.C.W.S. (3d) 157 (MacKay).
domain name and have ownership of it transferred to them, thus, the existing
jurisprudence has mainly focused on motions and applications for interim
orders, particularly injunctions.  Whether or not the use of a particular domain
name actually constitutes an infringement of a registered trade-mark is beyond
the scope of this paper1.
Federal Court Action
The jurisprudence in relation to domain name disputes in the Federal
Court of Canada has dealt primarily with actions for infringement of trade-mark
under s. 22 of the Canadian Trade-marks Act2 and corollary injunctive relief to
restrain someone from using a domain name.  In order to obtain an injunction
in the Federal Court, an applicant must meet a threefold test.  First the applicant
must satisfy the Court that there is either a prima facie case, or at least a serious
question to be tried. Second, the applicant has to demonstrate that unless the
injunction is granted, it will suffer irreparable harm that is not susceptible to, or
is difficult to compensate in damages. Finally, the balance of convenience must
lie with the applicant.  Invariably, the relief to restrain the use of domain names
has been brought in the form of injunction.
The first case in the Federal Court of Canada in relation to domain
names was filed in 1997.  In ITV Technologies Inc. v. WIC Television Inc.3, the
plaintiff, a British Columbia corporation, was a web provider and had an
Internet address «www.itv.net».  The defendant, also a British Columbia
corporation, was in the business of television broadcasting and owned several
trade marks using «ITV» and had registered a web site with the domain name
«www.ITV.ca».  The plaintiff sought an order expunging the «ITV» trade-marks
of the defendant and a declaration that the plaintiff was not precluded by those
trade-marks from using the web address «www.itv.net».  The defendant filed a
counterclaim alleging infringement of its ITV trademarks and sought an interim
injunction.  MacKay J. ordered an interim injunction, pending a hearing for an
interlocutory injunction until trial and issued an order restraining the plaintiff
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4. (1997), 77 A.C.W.S. (3d) 160 (Pinard).
5. (1999), 90 A.C.W.S. (3d) 857 (Teitelbaum). The Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of
application to the Federal Court of Appeal. The appeal was dismissed, 2001 FCA 11  (Noel,
Evans, Sharlow, JJ.A.).
6. (2000), 7 C.P.R. (4th) 92 (Heneghan, J.).  The Defendants had previously brought a motion
for particulars (96 A.C.W.S. (3d) 366, Blais, J,) which was granted in part.
7. About a year later, the defendant applied for a motion to remove the plaintiff’s solicitor.  The
defendant wanted to examine the plaintiff’s counsel about an e-mail the receipt of which had
been denied by plaintiff’s counsel.  Morneau Prothonotary , dismissed the motion because
of the expense of litigation, the enormous waste of  time. Further, it was far from certain that
from using the ITV trade-marks.  Pinard J. dismissed the defendant’s subsequent
motion for an interlocutory injunction because no case for irreparable harm had
been established4.  Two years later, the plaintiff's application for summary
judgment for a declaration that it was entitled to use the domain name
«www.itv.net» was dismissed because issues of confusion and distinctiveness
had been raised5.
Before any injunctive order can be issued, an applicant must show that
a prima facie case exists.  In Weight Watchers International v. Vale Printing
Ltd.6, the plaintiff commenced an action for trade-mark infringement, statutory
passing off and depreciation of goodwill.  The defendant had displayed the
plaintiff’s trade-mark WEIGHT WATCHERS and the term «WW» on its Web
sites at the domain names «www.wwcompanion.net» and
«www.wwcompanion.com». The defendant did not shut down the sites as
promised, but removed all explicit references to the plaintiff’s trade-mark and
then transferred the domain names to two third parties.  The plaintiff brought a
motion for an order to add the new owners of the domain names as defendants
and for an interlocutory injunction to restrain any further transfer and use of the
domain names.  Heneghen J. granted the motion to add the two new owners as
defendants and issued an order that the web sites could not be again transferred.
However, there was no evidence on which the court could order that the transfer
of the domain names to the third party be cancelled because it was not shown
that they had violated the plaintiff’s trade-mark WEIGHT WATCHERS.  Nor
had the plaintiff shown that it had any rights in the term «WW».  Further, the
new owners had not displayed the trade-mark WEIGHT WATCHERS on the
Web sites.  Thus, no order cancelling the transfer of or restraining the use of the
domain names was issued7.
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the merits of the case warranted examination of the plaintiff’s solicitor.  (2001), 106
A.C.W.S. (3d) 539.
8. (2000), 6 C.P.R. (4th) 487 (Heneghan J.).
9. The defendant’s inability to pay damages was not sufficient for the irreparable harm test.
Further, the plaintiff had not shown that it had lost or would lose reputation, brand name
awareness, consumer loyalty or the ability to attract advertisers.  (2000), 6 C.P.R. (4th) 487
at 491.
10. (1999), 2 C.P.R. (4th) 289 (Blais J.).
A change of circumstances can be fatal to an application for injunction
as was shown in Toronto.com v. Sinclair8.  The plaintiff had operated a Web site
under the domain name «www.toronto.com».  The defendant later operated a
Web site under the domain name «www.toronto2.com» and framed portions of
several Web pages published on the plaintiff’s site.  The plaintiff commenced
an action for passing off and for copyright infringement and brought a motion
for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendants from using its domain
name.   By the time the motion was brought, the defendant’s Web site no longer
had framed content from the plaintiff’s Web site. Heneghan J. was of the
opinion that the plaintiff had not shown clear evidence that it would suffer
irreparable harm.  In this case, infringement of the proprietary rights that were
at issue had not constituted irreparable harm because the harm could be
quantified in monetary terms. Nor was there any proof that the plaintiff’s
goodwill had been diminished.  Thus the motion was dismissed9.
Not all aggrieved plaintiffs have been unable to obtain an interlocutory
injunction to restrain the use of a domain name.  In Bell Actimedia Inc. v.
Puzo10, the plaintiff owned registered trade-marks in «YELLOW PAGES» and
«PAGES JAUNES» which it had used for 50 years.  It had used these trade-
marks in association with telephone directories and had annual sales of 500
million dollars. The defendants obtained the domain name
«www.lespagesjaunes.com» and through this Web site marketed a business
directory of the French speaking world. The plaintiff commenced an action for
trade-mark infringement, depreciation of registered trade-marks and
contravention of s. 7 of the Trade-marks Act.  After obtaining two interim
injunctions, the plaintiff brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to
continue the interim injunctions until trial.  Blais J. was of the opinion that there
was a serious issue to be tried and that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable
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11. The defendant was also ordered to deliver to the plaintiff all computer hardware and software
bearing the trade-mark «Pages Jaunes» and copies of «all purchase orders, invoices, sales
slips, delivery slips, bills of lading, custom broker documents and records relating to the
defendant’s business.  These were to be used to establish the damages and/or profits payable
to the Plaintiff».  (1999), 2 C.P.R. (4th) 289 at 294.
12. (2000), 101 A.C.W.S. (3d) 600. (O’Keefe J.)  In this case there was a joint statement of facts
that the Court adopted.
13. The defendant had indicated that it would continue using this trade name unless enjoined
from doing so.  However, there was no injunction granted with respect to loss of goodwill
because the evidence did not show any depreciation in the value of the goodwill attached to
the plaintiff’s trade-mark.
harm if the interlocutory injunction was not granted. The court was influenced
by the plaintiff’s level of sales and the fact that it had dealt with tens of
thousands of businesses for over 50 years.  The Federal Court ordered that an
interlocutory injunction be granted to restrain the defendant from using the
domain name «www.lespagesjaunes.com» or any other domain name
confusingly similar to this one11.
The only case relating to a domain name dispute in Federal Court that
has had a decision on the substantive issues raised in it has been Sprint Canada
Inc. v. Merlin International Communications Inc.12  In this case, the plaintiff
which was the registered owner of  «SPRINT» trade-mark for use in the
telecommunications industry, sought injunctions and damages for trade-mark
infringement because the defendant had used «Sprint Canada» as a trade name
in the communications business.  O’Keefe J. was of the opinion that there was
infringement because of the likelihood that the trade name of the defendant
would cause confusion with the trademark of the plaintiff.  Because the plaintiff
indicated it would use the trade name unless enjoined from doing so, the Court
granted a quia timet injunction13.  However, no injunction was granted to
restrain the defendant from adopting domain names in Canada that might be
confusing with the plaintiff’s trade-marks.  Even though the defendant had
obtained domain names «www.sprintcanada.com» and «www.sprintus.com», it
had not set up a web site to offer services under these names nor had services
been offered through the web site addresses. Their use as e-mail sites by the
defendant did not constitute infringement of the plaintiff’s trade-mark.
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14. In Canada Post v. Epost Innovations Inc. (1999), 2 C.P.R. (4th) 21 (Hargrave J.) the plaintiff
which owned several trade-marks that included the word «Post» commenced an action for
trade-mark infringement against the defendant who had obtained «www.cypost.com» as a
domain name.  The defendant made a motion for particulars and the plaintiff was ordered to
provide the dates of first use for each mark allegedly infringed as well as trade-marks that
were associated with «electronic message services».  The request for identification of wares
and services was denied.  The defendant’s subsequent application for declaratory relief was
dismissed (1999), 91 A.C.W.S. (3d) 214 (Edwards J.).  Over a year later, the plaintiff
brought a motion to strike out several paragraphs of the defendant’s statement of defense and
counterclaim.  This motion was granted in part (2001), 105 A.C.W.S. (3d) 140 (Hargrave,
P.).
In Molson Breweries v. Kuettner (1999), 3 C.P.R. (4th) 479 (Aronovitch P), the plaintiff
owned registered trade-marks «MOLSON» and «MOLSON’S».  The defendant had
registered with Network Solutions, Inc. the domain names «www.molson.com» and
«www.molsonbeer.com».  As was the policy of Network Solutions, Inc., upon notice of a
complaint from a third party, it placed the domain names on a «hold» status.  Network
Solutions, Inc. made a declaration that it would not allow any change to the registration or
status of the domain names until a Court rendered a temporary or final decision regarding
the interests of the defendant.  The plaintiff then commenced an action for trade-mark
infringement and brought a motion seeking leave to deposit this declaration into the registry
of the Court.  By its terms the declaration tendered control over the use and registration of
the domain names to the Court.  The Court noted that the law with respect to domain names,
their registration, the rights and property that they confer were merely nascent.  The court
was also concerned that it might assume a potential burden and even responsibility if the
declaration were to be deposited into the Court registry.  It was not clear whether intellectual
property was «property» within the meaning of Rule 377 of the Federal Court Rules and
further that there was no evidence of irreparable harm if the application were denied.  The
motion was dismissed without prejudice to the parties to bring a subsequent motion.  No
such motion has ever been brought.
Other domain name cases in the Federal Court have dealt primarily with
procedural issues14.  Apart from Sprint Canada Inc., none of the cases has
proceeded to trial.  Only in Bell Actimedia Inc. was the defendant ordered not
to use a domain name. Thus, aggrieved plaintiffs have had limited success in the
Federal Court of Canada in obtaining orders to restrain defendants from using
domain names that have allegedly infringed trade-marks.  
Provincial Courts
Provincial superior courts have heard cases dealing with passing off,
breach of copyright or defamation in relation to domain name disputes.   These
actions are well known to the common law.  In a passing-off action, the plaintiff
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15. (1995), 61 C.P.R. (3d) 334. (MacDonald C.J.T.D., Prince Edward Island Supreme Court,
Trial Division).
16. McDonald C.J.T.D. found that the plaintiff had only made superficial submissions without
explaining the Internet.  Nor had the plaintiff given viva voce evidence, but had merely filed
a short affidavit.  On the other hand, the defendant gave direct evidence and stated that
anyone trying to contact the plaintiff using PEI.NET would be unable to do so. (1995), 61
C.P.R. (3d) 334 at 338.
must prove the existence of goodwill, deception of the public due to a
misrepresentation and actual or potential damage to the plaintiff.  In order to
prove breach of copyright, the plaintiff must show that another person has
reproduced an original artistic work belonging to the plaintiff without
permission.  The three elements of defamation are simply stated : the words in
question have been published, the words refer to the plaintiff and the words, in
their natural or ordinary meaning, or some extended meaning, are defamatory
of the plaintiff.   Despite the clarity with which these causes of action may be
stated, their proof in court requires a high level of evidence, particularly if there
is potential issue of bad faith, breach of fiduciary duty or a constitutional
argument.
The first judicial involvement with a domain name dispute occurred in
1995 in the Trial Division of the Supreme Court of Prince Edward Island.  In
PEINET Inc. v. O’Brien15 the plaintiff which provided access services to the
Internet used the domain name «www.peinet.pe.ca».  The defendant who once
was an employee of the plaintiff formed his own business as an Internet service
provider and obtained the domain name «www.PEI.NET».  The plaintiff feared
public confusion with its corporate name and commenced an action of passing
off and sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the defendant from using
the domain name «www.PEI.NET».  MacDonald C.J.T.D. noted that the whole
area of the use of the Internet and its conventions was new to the court.
However, even if the domain name «www.PEI.NET» was an infringement of use
of the plaintiff’s name, the plaintiff had not established the elements of a
passing-off action16.   Specifically, there was no misrepresentation that would
likely lead the public to believe that the services offered by the defendant were
the services of the plaintiff because upper case letters and a period were used in
the disputed name.  Therefore, the application for an interlocutory injunction to
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17. (2000), 8 C.P.R. (4th) 12 (Mesbur J., Ontario Court of Justice).
18. This motion was under Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194.  A
claim can only be struck if, even on the basis of those facts being proved, it is plain and
obvious, or proved beyond doubt, the claim must nevertheless fail.
19. There has been no report of a decision at trial.
20. (2001), 12 C.P.R. (4th) 4 (Laing J., Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench).
restrain the defendant from using the domain name «www.PEI.NET» was
dismissed.
The Ontario Superior Court was less sympathetic to the use of a near
identical domain name in Airline Seat Co. v. 1396804 Ontario Inc.17 wherein the
defendant merely deleted a dash in an otherwise identical domain name.  The
plaintiff, an English travel company carrying on business under the name
«Canadian Affair», conducted a significant portion of business through an
interactive Web site at «www.canadian-affair.com».  The defendant, a current
competitor of the plaintiff, obtained a domain name «www.canadianaffair.com»
whose web site allegedly contained pornographic text.  The plaintiff commenced
an action for passing off and defamation.   The defendant moved18 to strike the
defamation and passing-off claims.  Mesbur J. was of the opinion that the claim
would not necessarily fail because all the elements of both defamation and
passing off were in the claim and could not find it plain and obvious, or beyond
doubt that there was no reasonable cause of action.  Thus the motion was
dismissed19.
A person who has no legitimate interest in a domain name may be
restrained from using it if it is confusingly similar to the name of another
business that is well known.  This is particularly true if a person has registered
the name with the intention of selling it either to the business that has an interest
in restraining its use or to a highest bidder. In the Internet this pernicious
practice is known as cyber-squatting.  In Saskatchewan Star Phoenix Group Inc.
v. Noton20 the plaintiff published the StarPhoenix, the largest paper in
Saskatchewan and maintained a Web site at «www.thestarphoenix.com» that
contained lead stories and advertising.  The defendant was in the business of
registering domain names with the intention of selling them to interested
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21. The domain names «www.thestarphoenix.com» and «www.starphoenix.com» were also on
a list of names offered for sale by the defendant.
22. This order included the three domain names.
23. (2001), 102 A.C.W.S. (3d) 975 (Sigurdson J., B.C.S.C.).   This case has been subsequently
considered in Law Society of British Columbia v. Canada Domain Name Exchange Corp.
(2002), 22 C.P.R. (4th) 88 (Williamson J., British Columbia Supreme Court).
parties21.  He obtained the domain name «www.saskatoonstarphoenix.com» and
created a Web site that looked identical to the plaintiff’s except that different
advertising was inserted.  The plaintiff commenced an action for passing off.  As
the defendant was noted in default, the plaintiff applied for assessment of
damages and an order for permanent injunction.   The plaintiff was awarded
damages for passing off and was also granted an order restraining the defendant
from using the domain names.  The defendant was also ordered to transfer to the
plaintiff the domain names within 30 days22. 
Freedom of expression, in certain circumstances, can weigh heavily in
a passing off action even if there is intentional use of a trade-mark in a domain
name.  In British Columbia Automobile Association v. O.P.E.I.U.23 the British
Columbia Supreme Court agreed that the common law should be interpreted in
a manner consistent with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The plaintiff was
a not-for-profit automobile association and had obtained domain names
«www.bcaa.bc.ca» and «www.bcaa.com» and «www.bcaa.org».  The defendant
union during strike action at the plaintiff, launched a Web site containing
copyright and trade-mark materials of the plaintiff and obtained domain names
«www.bcaabacktowork.com» and «www.bcaaonstrike.com». The plaintiff
claimed passing-off, trade-mark and copyright infringement and launched an
application for damages, a declaration, a permanent injunction, an order to
deliver up infringing materials as well as an order to cancel or transfer to the
plaintiff the union domain names.  Sigurdson J. held that the domain names
were neither misleading nor identical to the plaintiff’s. Further, even though the
defendant intercepted people intending to search for «BCAA», the domain
names by themselves constituted no misrepresentation to the reasonably prudent
Internet user.  Nor was the defendant competing commercially with the plaintiff,
but was merely attempting to communicate its message to the public about an
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24. There was no order of declaration nor permanent injunction granted.  Damages for passing
off and breach of trade-mark were also declined because there was no passing-off and the
defendant’s use of the trade-marks was outside the scope of s. 22 of the Trade-marks Act.
However, nominal damages in the amount of $2,500 were awarded to the plaintiff for breach
of copyright and passing off in the Union’s early Web sites. (2001), 102 A.C.W.S. (3d) 975.
25. (2001), 104 A.C.W.S. (3d) 856 (Nordheimer J., Ontario Superior Court of Justice).
26. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11.
27. (1999), 91 A.C.W.S. (3d) 563 (Nordheimer J. Ontario Superior Court of Justice).
28. The Court granted the motion to dissolve the injunction in respect of the gray market
activities only.  The black market activities remained within the prohibition because they
likely violated the Radiocommunication Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. R.2.  The parties sought a
further motion to clarify the wording of the order to show that the original order was varied.
(2001), 105 A.C.W.S. (3d) 335.
ongoing labour relations campaign.  Thus the application for an order to cancel
or deliver up and transfer the domain names to the plaintiff was declined24.
In Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Tedmonds & Co.25 the exercise
of free speech which is protected by s. 2(b) of the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms26 also impacted upon the Court’s decision in considering a motion for
interlocutory injunction.  The plaintiff applied for and was granted an
interlocutory injunction prohibiting the defendants from distributing equipment
in Canada that could receive and decode encrypted subscription programming
signals from the United States27.  Some time later the defendant brought a
motion to dissolve this injunction.  The plaintiff also brought a motion for a
permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from using the domain name
«www.expressvu.org» for a web site used for the purpose of promoting the
«Tedsat Legal Defense Fund» and criticizing the plaintiff as a commercial
enterprise.   The word «ExpressVu» was registered as a trade-mark assigned to
the plaintiff.  Anyone searching for «expressvu» would be directed to the
defendant’s web site and the domain name used in this way would allegedly
infringe the trade-mark.  The Ontario Superior Court dismissed the plaintiff’s
motion for lack of a genuine issue for trial because there was no commercial use
of the plaintiff’s trade-mark nor intention to tarnish the trade-mark, but rather
merely criticism of the plaintiff as a commercial enterprise28.
If the availability of a domain name has become known through a
potential breach of fiduciary duty or bad faith execution of a contract, a
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29. (2000), 7 C.P.R. (4TH) 107 (Lee J., Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench).
30. At this time, Network Solutions Inc. no longer placed domain names on hold in these
circumstances.
restraining order may be granted.  Registration of a domain name for the prime
purpose of selling it to a business that has a legitimate interest in it or even for
the purpose of disrupting the business, may also be grounds for a restraining
order. In such circumstances, the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench did order that
a domain name not be transferred in Innersense International v. Manegre29.  The
plaintiff distributed beauty products to more than 300 individual distributors in
Canada and the U.S., all of whom had access to the Web site at
«www.innersense.com».  The plaintiff had a registered trade-mark in the name
«Innersense» and obtained its domain name through a trusted employee,
Michelle Menagre who also was charged with the responsibility of developing
the Innersense Web site.  The domain name was not renewed by the plaintiff but
taken up by Michelle Menagre’s brother, Keith who had it removed from the
Telus host servers, and then offered to sell the domain name to the plaintiff for
$20,000.  Mr. Menagre told reporters that he had immediate plans to sell the
domain name to a performing group in the United States. 
 The plaintiff commenced an action for trade-mark infringement and for
an order directing return of the domain name.  The plaintiff also brought a
motion for an interim injunction restraining the defendants from selling or
transferring the domain name30.  The Court was of the opinion that there was a
serious issue was to be tried and that irreparable harm would result if the
injunction were not granted.  There was uncertainty surrounding the value of the
domain name as a marketable entity and the defendant might not have the means
to pay an undefined amount of damages.  The Court also was of the opinion that
the balance of convenience was best served by granting the injunction because
the domain name could be quickly transferred beyond the jurisdiction of the
Court.  In addition, the viability of the plaintiff’s business could be seen tied to
its domain name in the eyes of its customers.  Thus the order for an interim
injunction was granted.
A person who has no legitimate interest in a domain name other than for
resale at an exorbitant price may well be considered to be acting in bad faith,
and thus an order restraining the transfer of the name may be issued.  Such was
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31. (2001), 197 D.L.R. (4th) 760 (Chadwick J., Ontario Superior Court).
32. R.S.O. 1990, c. B.17.
33. The plaintiff laid a complaint to CIRA, but was advised that its dispute resolution policy was
not yet in effect.
34. The plaintiff agreed to post $25,000 as security for damages.
35. (2001), 55 O.R. (3d) 334 (Nordheimer J., Ontario Superior Court of Justice).
Nutrisystems.com Inc. also commenced proceedings under the Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy and ICANN, but on November 28, 2000, the arbitrators declined
to order that the domain name be transferred to Nurisystem.com Inc.  Nutrisystem.com, Inc.
v. Easthaven, Ltd.  (2000), CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, File Number 012,
(O’Shaughnessy, Menkel-Meadow, Ellicott).
the case in Itravel2000.com Inc. v. Fagan31.  The plaintiff who was a travel
retailer with a web site at «www.itravel2000.com» had registered the name
«Itravel» with the Travel Industry Council of Ontario and under the Business
Names Act32.  The plaintiff wanted to register the domain name
«www.Itravel.ca» with the newly created Canadian Internet Registration
Authority to obtain a «.ca» domain name.   The defendant, who had no
connection with the travel industry, had already registered this name and was
willing to sell it to the highest bidder.  The plaintiff brought an action and sought
an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendant from using, selling,
transferring, disposing of, or otherwise dealing with the domain name33.  The
Court held that there was a serious issue to be tried and that the plaintiff would
suffer irreparable harm if the domain name were sold before trial.  Also because
the plaintiff had been expanding its travel business on the Internet and the
defendant had acquired the domain name merely to sell it, the balance of
convenience favoured the plaintiff.  The Court granted the interlocutory
injunction34. 
The Ontario Superior Court of Justice has dealt with one domain name
dispute that has come forward not from any cause of action arising in Ontario,
but from one in the United States. Before hearing Easthaven, Ltd. v.
Nutrisystem.com Inc.35, Nordheimer J. had to decide whether the Ontario Court
of Justice had jurisdiction to hear the case because one party was not domiciled
in Ontario.  Easthaven, Ltd., a corporation incorporated in Barbados with its
head office in Bridgetown, owned the domain name «www.sweetsuccess.com»
which featured sports-related content.  The domain name was registered with a
Delaware corporation whose head office was located in Toronto.
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36. Nutrisystems.com Inc. relied upon the Cyberpiracy Act, 15 U.S.C. & 1125 (1999).
37. (2000), 58 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1160, (Fullam, Sr. J., United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  The e-mail and telephone call that included an offer to sell
the domain name were sufficient to confer specific jurisdiction upon the Court.
38. The plaintiff ceased to participate in the action, thus Nutrisystems.com Inc. brought a motion
for an adjudication of contempt against the plaintiff.  This motion was denied. 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXSIS 5372.
39. The court also noted that Pennsylvania had already assumed jurisdiction and was the more
convenient forum to determine the issues raised in this action. Supra note 35 at 344.
Nutrisystem.com Inc., a Delaware corporation with major business in
Pennsylvania, owned the trade-mark «Sweet Success» which was used in
connection with weight loss programmes that it marketed.  Upon an inquiry of
the Easthaven, Ltd., Nutrisystem.com Inc. was informed that the domain name
was for sale for $146,250.  Nutrisystem.com Inc. then commenced an action to
gain control over the domain name36.  Easthaven, Ltd. unsuccessfully brought
a motion in Pennsylvania to dismiss the action for lack of in personam
jurisdiction37.   Even though the Court dismissed the motion, it subsequently
granted Nutrisystem.com Inc. a preliminary injunction restraining Easthaven,
Ltd. from transferring the domain name to anyone other than Nutrisystem.com
Inc38.
Easthaven, Ltd. then commenced an action in Ontario for damages and
a declaration that it owned the domain name and an order to transfer
«www.sweetsuccess.com» to it.  Nutrisystem.com Inc. moved to have the action
dismissed on the basis of forum non conveniens.  The Court held that there was
no real and substantial connection between Ontario and the subject matter of the
litigation.  The mere fact that the domain name was registered by a corporation
that happened to carry on business in Toronto did not give the domain name any
physical presence or existence in Ontario.  Nutrisystem.com Inc. was neither
domiciled nor engaged in activities in Ontario, therefore, the Ontario court had
no general jurisdiction.  The court noted that it would be unreasonable to
exercise jurisdiction over a Pennsylvania corporation at the behest of a Barbados
corporation and accordingly granted the stay39.
As in the Federal Court of Canada, domain name disputes in the
provincial superior courts have primarily dealt with procedural issues.  Only in
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40. Supra note 23.
41. Supra note 20.
42. Supra note 23.
43. Supra note 14.
44. For example, ITV Technologies Inc. v. WIC Television Inc., supra note 3; Weight Watchers
International v. Vale Printing Ltd., supra note 6; Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v.
Tedmonds & Co. supra note 25 and Easthaven, Ltd. v. Nutrisystem.com Inc. supra note 35.
45. The last search was conducted on November 1, 2002.  Cases in which the challenger was
successful were, Bell Actimedia Inc. v. Puzo, Sprint Canada Inc. v. Merlin International
Communications Inc., Saskatchewan Star Phoenix Group Inc. v. Noton, Innersense
British Columbia Automobile Association v. O.P.E.I.U.40 has the court had the
opportunity of rendering a decision on the substantive issues.  A final order was
issued in Saskatchewan Star Phoenix Group Inc. v. Noton41, but on the basis of
a default judgment. In the provincial courts, broader legal principles such as
potential breach of fiduciary duty, freedom of speech and jurisdiction have been
invoked to assist the courts.  However, the reach of their application has been
limited due to the nature of procedural issues.   
Assessment
The fact that the majority of cases have dealt with only procedural
motions and applications for injunctions would make any assessment difficult.
Only two of the fifteen Canadian cases dealing with domain name disputes have
issued decisions on the substantive issues.  Despite the very expansive and
thorough reasoning of Sigurdson J. in the British Columbia Automobile
Association v. O.P.E.I.U.42, one could argue that it is too early to make any
opinion of legal precedent in this area.  As stated in Molson Breweries v.
Kuettner, the law in respect of domain names is merely nascent43.  Several of the
cases have had subsequent motions and applications and have not yet been listed
for trial44.
However, a current search in the Internet of the disputed domain names
from both the federal and the provincial superior courts has revealed just how
checkered and dubious the court system has been in resolving domain name
disputes.  In the fifteen cases, five cases in which the party challenging the
domain name has been successful, none of the domain names could be found
when the search was conducted45.  A search of the domain name in the one case
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International v. Manegre and Itravel 2000.com v. Itravel2000.com Inc. v. Fagan, supra
note 31.
46. Easthaven, Ltd. v. Nutrisystem.com Inc. supra note 35.
47. The last search was conducted on November 1, 2002.  Cases in which the challenger had no
success but domain names are not in use were, Weight Watchers International v. Vale
Printing Ltd., PEINET Inc. v. O’Brien, Airline Seat Co. v. 1396804 Ontario Inc.and British
Columbia Automobile Association v. O.P.E.I.U.
48. Molson Breweries v. Kuettner, supra note 14.
49. Challenged domain names still in use were, ITV Technologies Inc. v. WIC Television Inc.,
Toronto.com v. Sinclair, Canada Post v. Epost Innovations Inc., Bell Expressvu Limited
Partnership v. Tedmonds & Co.
wherein the court declined jurisdiction has resulted in a transfer to the web site
of the party that challenged the name46.  These results were to be expected.
Cases in which the challenging party has had no success have had
interesting search results.  In four cases in which the challenging party was
unsuccessful in obtaining an injunction, the domain names could not be found
in a current search47.  In another case, the search resulted in a transfer to the
corporate web site of the unsuccessful party48.  In these cases the original owner
of the domain name entered into a settlement agreement with the challenger,
altered its expectation of the worth of the domain name or simply abandoned the
name as a result of some business decision.  Finally, in the four cases in which
the challenger had no success, the domain names were still in use by the
successful party49.
Because most of the cases have not progressed to trial, any analysis
based on procedural outcome would be, at best, tentative.  However, it could be
argued that going to trial, and even the court system itself, might not necessarily
be the best avenue to address domain name disputes. The court system with its
propensity to resort to procedure to resolve disputes has been time consuming
and costly.  Taking years to resolve a dispute that relates to an address in the
Internet has been wasteful for two reasons.  Technological changes have not
waited for time consuming court challenges.  New top-level domains have been
created for registration of new domain names that might not be technically
identical to ones already challenged.  Second, prolonged disputes have resulted
in economic waste.  Legal costs and foregone use have created business
opportunity costs that users have been reluctant to absorb.
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50. Natheson, Showdown at the Domain Name Corral : Property Rights and Personal
Jurisdiction over Squatters, Poachers and Other Parasites (1997), 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 911
and G. P. Albert, Right on the Mark : Defining the Nexus Between Trademarks and Internet
Domain Names (1997), 15 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 277.
51. See Final Report of International Ad Hoc Committee : Recommendations for Administration
and Management of gTDLs «http ://www.iahc.org/draftt-iahc-recommend-00.html».  See
also, Memorandum of Understanding for the Internet Council of Registrars
«http ://www.gtld-mou.org.docs/core-mou.htm».
52. ICANN is a non-profit corporation that was formed to assume responsibility for managing
the domain name system.  This function was previously performed under U.S. Government
contract by IANA.  See, «http ://www.ican.org/urdp/urdp-schedule.htm».
53. See policy at, «http ://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm».  For rules, see,
«http ://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-rules-240ct99.htm».
54. For a listing of all cases, see, «http ://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/cases/all/html».
The New Approach
Another venue for the resolution of domain name disputes had been in
the works even as the Canadian judiciary dealt with the above-noted cases.
Network Solution, Inc. (NSI), which registered top-level domain names in
«.com», «.net» and «.org», had a simple, but unworkable dispute policy in place
by mid 1995.  Because NSI administered its dispute policy, it too often found
itself involved in expensive litigation.  Also, the dispute policy met criticism
from several quarters that NSI was merely protecting its own self interest and
had not taken into account the interests of the Internet community as a whole50.
In a parallel development, the Internet Society formed the International Ad Hoc
Committee («IAHC») at the request of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
to enhance the general class of the generic top-level domains.  IAHC’s report,
published in 1997, included recommendations and provisions to deal with
domain name disputes51.
Before long the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(«ICANN») adopted the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy («UDRP») and
rules which set up administrative proceedings independent from NSI for the
resolution of domain name disputes52.  This system was not intended to replace
recourse to the courts, but to provide an expeditious forum for the resolution of
a domain name dispute.  Under the rules, a dispute could be processed and
decided by a panel within three months53. The UDRP and rules have been in
place since October 1999 and panels have heard thousands of cases54.
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55. See, «http ://www.cira.ca/en/about_docs.html».
56. For formal recognition, see, «http://www.iana.org/reports/industry-canada-letter-
10oct00.htm». For re-delegation, see, «http://www.iana.org/reports/ca-report-01dec00.htm».
57. For the policy, see, «http ://www.cira.ca/en/cat_dpr_policy.html».  For the rules, see,
«http ://www.cira.ca/en/cat_dpr_rules.html».
58. See, «http ://www.cira.ca/en/doc_Registration.html».
59. For example, legitimate interests and bad faith in paragraph 3 of the CIRA policy have had
their meanings altered slightly in order to address challenges with the WIPO definitions in
paragraph 4.
60. CIRA had determined that the .ca domain space should be developed as a key public
resource for the social and economic development of all Canadians.  Thus, after November
8, 2000, all registrants must meet Canadian Presence Requirements.  Only the following
individuals or entities will be permitted to register, hold and maintain a domain name : a
citizen, permanent resident, legal representative of them, corporation, trust, partnership or
association, trade union, political party, educational institution, library, archive, museum,
hospital, Indian band, aboriginal people, government or owners or trademarks or official
marks. The Guidelines have spelled out in detail the level of Canadian presence to meet the
requirement.  See,. «http ://www.cira.ca/official-doc/47.RPPG_00006EN.txt».
During the 1990s, the Internet was growing at an explosive rate in
Canada as well.  Discussions in the 1997 Canadian Internet Conference led to
the formation of the Canadian Domain Names Consultative Committee to
address reform of the .ca domain to a more commercial type of operation.  The
Committee recommended that a private sector non-profit corporation be set up
to take over the administration of the .ca from the University of British
Columbia55.  In late 1998, the Canadian Internet Registration Authority (CIRA)
was incorporated to assume this function.  In early 1999, the federal government
formally recognized CIRA as the new administrator of the .ca and by December
2000, IANA had re-delegated the .ca top-level domain to CIRA56.
In November 2001, CIRA had developed and published its own Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy («policy») and Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy Rules («rules»)57.  The policy and rules became contractually
incorporated into every .ca domain registration agreement58. Although the policy
and rules were based on those developed by ICANN, several modifications in
terminology have been introduced59.   One important change has been the
requirement that the complainant satisfy the Canadian Presence Requirements
for Registrants60. 
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61. Supra note 57, the polcy para. 1.
62. Ibid. See the policy, para. 2 and the rules, para. 3.  After the complaint has been submitted,
the proceeding may not be terminated except by written consent of the parties and notice by
them to the provider.  See, para. 8 of the rules.  Further, upon receipt of the complaint from
the provider, CIRA will not allow the registration of the domain name that is the subject of
the complaint to be cancelled or transferred.  See, para. 2.4 of the policy.
63. Ibid., the Policy, para. 3.2.
The purpose of the CIRA policy is to provide a forum in which cases of
bad faith registration of .ca domain names can be dealt with relatively
inexpensively and quickly61. The policy and rules have set forth terms and
conditions for the resolution by arbitration of a domain name dispute.  The
dispute resolution process is called a «Proceeding».  The «Complainant», the
person initiating the proceeding, submits a complaint to a «Service Provider»,
the body that administers the dispute resolution process.  The «Registrant» is the
person who has obtained the registration of a domain name that is in dispute.
To accomplish the stated purpose of the policy, the rights of the complainant and
registrant and the obligations of the panel and provider have been finely
balanced in the rules.  Further, each step of the process is procedurally
controlled by the rules.
The Complaint
A proceeding is commenced when a complainant submits a complaint
to a service provider62.  The complaint must be submitted in English or French,
and be in hard copy as well as electronic form.  The contents of the complaint
are laid out in the rules.  The complainant must specify the basis upon which
CIRA’s Canadian Presence Requirements are satisfied.  The complaint must
also state how and to whom any communication for the complainant must be
transmitted.  The name of the registrant and its registration information known
by the complaint must be provided.  Every registration that is the subject of the
complaint and the identity of the registrars of each registration must be
specified.  
The substantive contents of the complaint are laid out in the rules63.  The
particulars for the basis of the complaint must be drafted in no more than 5000
words and be in accordance with the policy.  Three key elements must be
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64. Ibid. For the meanings of  «Mark», «Rights» and «Confusingly Similar», see the Policy, para.
3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
65. Ibid. For the meanings «Use», «Legitimate Interests» and «Registration in bad faith», see the
Policy, para. 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7.
66. Ibid. Appendix «A» of the policy is the Complainant’s Certificate.  The complainant agrees
to be bound by CIRA’s policy and rules.  The complainant also agrees to release CIRA, the
provider, registrar and panel from any liability.  The complainant also agrees to submit to
the jurisdiction of the Registrant should the panel decision be appealed to superior court in
Canada.
67. Ibid. The response is governed by para. 5 of the rules.
68. Ibid., the rules, para. 2.  Communication of the complaint from the provider to the registrant
must be in both English and French.  The language of the response is determined by the
registrant.
shown.  First, why the registrant’s domain name is confusingly similar to a mark
in which the complainant had rights prior to the date of registration must be
shown64.  Second, why the registrant has no legitimate interest in the domain
name must be proven.  Third, why the registrant is considered as having
registered the domain name in bad faith must be stated65.  A summary of
relevant Canadian law together with references to prior dispute resolution
proceedings must be provided.  In addition, trade-marks upon which the
complaint is based must be specified as well as a description of goods, services
or business activities for which the trade-mark has been used.
There are several other details as to the form of the complaint that must
also be complied with.  Up to 5 candidates from the service provider’s list shall
be nominated by the complainant to serve as panelists. The remedy must be
specified.  There must be a request that the complaint be submitted for a
decision in accordance with the policy and rules.  The complaint and any
annexed schedules must be submitted to the service provider in 5 hard copies.
Finally a certificate that obliges the complainant to agree to be bound by the
policy and the rules must be included66.  
The Response
The response must be filed with the provider within 20 days of the actual
or deemed receipt of the complaint67.  Five hard copies of the response together
with any schedules must be submitted in either English or French to the service
provider68.  
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69. Ibid.,  para. 5.2 of the rules.
70. Ibid., para. 5.2(h) of the rules.  Under Appendix «A» of the rules, the complainant has agreed
to pay these costs if ordered by the panel to do so.  The amount is to be paid to the provider
in trust.
71. Ibid.,  Appendix «B» of the rules.
As in the case of the complaint, the form of the response is clearly set
out in the rules69.  The name of the registrant together with its address, or its
authorized representative and how communication is to be conducted must be
provided.  Up to 5 panelists from the service provider’s list who can function in
the language of the proceeding must be nominated. The evidence and arguments
in the complaint must be responded to in not more that 5000 words. Why the
domain name should be maintained as is and why the registrant has a legitimate
interest in it must also be included within this limit.  A summary of relevant
Canadian law that includes any prior decisions of CIRA proceedings shall be
provided.   
If the registrant can prove on the balance of probabilities that the
complaint has been commenced in bad faith, then up to $5,000 for costs may be
claimed70.  In no more than 1000 words the registrant must show that the
complaint has been commenced unfairly and in a wrongful attempt to cancel or
obtain a transfer of the domain name.  The costs claimed must be related to
those incurred by the registrant in responding to the proceeding.  
The registrant may seek an extension of time by making a written
request to the provider before the response is due.  The provider might, in
exceptional circumstances, extend the filing period for up to 20 days.  The
period for filing the response may be consented to in writing by the parties
provided the provider has also approved this agreement.  However, the provider
has the discretion to determine whether exceptional circumstances warrant an
extension and the length of the extension.
The response must conclude with a certification by the registrant that the
information in the response is complete and accurate. Further, any assertions in
the response must be warranted by the policy, the rules or the law as it exists or
as it may be extended by argument in good faith71.  The registrant must also
agree that any challenge to the decision of the proceeding be submitted to a
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72. Ibid., If no court has jurisdiction over the registrant, then there is agreement to submit to the
court that has jurisdiction over the provider, or if none, to the jurisdiction of the superior
court in the city of Ottawa.  Appendix «B» para. 2.
73. Ibid., para. 7 of the rules.
74. Ibid., para. 9 of the rules.   The proceeding  and all documents must be in English or French
or a combination of the two languages.  See, para. 10 of the rules.
75. Ibid., para. 11.1 of the rules.
76. Ibid., para. 11.3 of the rules.  This also excludes any hearing by teleconference,
videoconference and web conference.
superior court of any province or territory in Canada that has jurisdiction over
the registrant72.
The Panel
The rules not only empower the panel to conduct the proceeding, but
also oblige each panelist to make a declaration of impartiality and
independence73.  Before accepting an appointment, each panelist must disclose
to the provider any circumstances that could bring impartiality or independence
into question.  Even if such circumstances do not arise until after a proceeding
commences, a panelist must make prompt disclosure to the service provider who
has the discretion to appoint a substitute panelist.  If discretion is exercised to
appoint a new panelist, the service provider must appoint a replacement as soon
as possible.
The proceeding must be conducted in a manner the panel considers
appropriate in accordance with the policy and the rules74.   The parties must be
treated with equality and each party must be given a fair opportunity to present
its case.  The panel is empowered to determine the admissibility, relevance,
materiality and weight of the evidence.  The complaint and response constitute
the complete record to be considered by the panel.  Neither party has the right
to submit further evidence or argument unless requested by the panel to do so75.
  Normally, the proceeding does not include an in-person hearing of any kind76.
 
 The panel must ensure that the proceeding has taken place in a timely
manner, but in exceptional cases, time limits set down in the rules may be
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77. Ibid., para. 9.1 of the rules.  If a party does not comply with a time frame, the panel, in the
absence of exceptional circumstances, must proceed to a decision of the complaint.  Para.
11.4 of the rules.
78. Ibid., para. 11.5 of the rules.
79. Ibid., para. 12.1 of the rules.
80. Ibid., para. 4.1 of the policy.
81. CIRA will implement a decision to cancel or transfer a domain name as soon as practicable,
but no sooner than 60 days after notification by the service provider.  If a domain name is
to be transferred to the complainant, then the transfer will be effected after the complainant
enters into a registration agreement with CIRA.  See, para. 4.5 of the policy.
82. Ibid., para. 4.3 of the policy.
extended77.  This extension may be at the request of a party or upon the panel’s
own motion.  Any written request by a party must be decided in accordance with
the policy and the rules.  In the absence of exceptional circumstances, failure to
comply with a time period established by the rules will force the panel to
proceed to a decision.  The panel is empowered to draw such inferences from
such default, as it considers appropriate78.
The panel must produce a written decision on the basis of the evidence
and argument submitted and in accordance with the policy and the rules and any
laws and principles of the relevant provincial or territorial jurisdiction79.  The
standard of proof is based upon the balance of probabilities80.  The decision must
be forwarded to the service provider within 21 days of the appointment of the
panel.  The decision is made by a majority of the panelists and any dissenting
opinion must accompany the majority decision.  The decision must be
communicated within 3 days to the parties, the relevant registrar and CIRA.  The
decision is then published on CIRA’s web site and the web site of the service
provider81.  
The panel may decide in favour of the registrant and deny the request to
cancel or transfer a domain name.  If the panel has decided in favour of the
complainant, the panel will then determine whether the registration of the
domain name is to be cancelled or transferred to the complainant82.  But, if the
registrant has been successful and has proven that the complaint was ommenced
in bad faith, then the panel might order the complainant to pay costs incurred by
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83. Ibid., para. 12.6 of the rules and 4.6 of the policy. This amount is paid to the service provider
in trust for the registrant.
84. Ibid., para. 1.6 of the policy.
85. Ibid., para. 4.1, 4.2, 5.4, 5.6, 6.4, 6.5, and 7.3 of the rules and para. 4.4 of the policy.
86. Ibid., para. 1.4 of the policy and para. 4.2(b) of the rules.
87. Ibid., para. 2.1 of the rules.
88. Ibid., para. 5.5 of the rules.
the registrant in responding to the proceeding.  An amount of up to $5,000 may
be ordered83. 
The Service Provider
Ostensibly the service provider administers all proceedings84.  However,
in reality, the service provider ensures that the proceedings comply with the
rules and policy to the greatest extent possible.  The service provider receives
all communications from the parties and ensures that they are dealt with in
compliance with stated time frames85.  The service provider receives the
complaint from the complainant and has three days to ensure that the
complainant is eligible and that no deficiencies exist86.  If the service provider
is not satisfied, then notice of all non-compliance must be given to the
complainant within 10 days following the latest receipt of both electronic and
hard copy versions.  The complainant has 10 days to correct all deficiencies to
the satisfaction of the service provider, otherwise, the proceeding will be
deemed to have been withdrawn.  
In cases when the service provider is satisfied that there has been
administrative compliance, the complaint in both English and French is
promptly sent to the registrant by whatever means available87.  The registrant’s
response is received and reviewed by the service provider to ensure
administrative compliance88.  Both the registrant and complainant must be given
notice of the nature of all deficiencies.  Any deficiencies must be corrected
within 10 days by the registrant to the satisfaction of the service provider,
otherwise, the panel must decide the proceeding on the basis of the complaint.
The service provider must approve any request for an extension of time.  The
service provider has the discretion to determine whether exceptional
circumstances exist to warrant an extension, and if so, the length of the
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extension89.  As soon as the response is in administrative compliance, the service
provider must promptly send it to the complainant.
The service provider is also instrumental in the selection of the panelists
and their appointment90.  The service provider must maintain on its web site a
list of qualified candidates who may serve as panelists.  If the language of the
complaint and response is not the same, the service provider must take steps to
ensure that the parties have selected suitable candidates.  In such circumstances,
the provider must give the complainant an opportunity to re-nominate candidates
who can function in both languages from the list of the service provider. The
service provider must appoint three panelists nominated in common by both
parties, or if only two names are the same, then those two together with one
selected by the service provider.  If only one panelist is nominated in common
by both parties, then the service provider selects two others.  If no panelists are
nominated in common by the parties, then the service provider must select all
three panelists.  The service provider has an obligation to select panelists at
random from its list91.  The panel must be appointed within 5 days after receipt
of the response.
If the registrant does not submit a response, then the service provider
must notify the complainant of its opportunity to convert the 3-member panel
into a single member panel92.  If the complainant wishes to exercise this option
within 5 days, written notice of agreement to the conversion must be given to the
service provider.  The service provider must then select a member who was not
on the list nominated by the complainant.  If the complainant fails to request the
conversion, then the service provider must select one from the complainant’s list
of nominees.      
   
The service provider appoints the panel. Notice must be given to the
parties of the appointed panelists and of the date by which a decision is to be
forwarded to the service provider93.  The service provider must select the chair
Judicial Involvement
(2003-04) 34 R.D.U.S. in Domain Name Disputes 399
in Canada
94. Ibid., para. 7.1 of the rules.
95. Ibid., para. 12.7 of the rules.
96. Ibid., para. 13.2 of the rules.  Or, if the panel has been appointed at the time of the
disclosure, then the panel has the discretion to make this decision.
97. Ibid., para. 1.7 of the policy.  However, the proceeding will be governed by the rules and
policy of CIRA unless otherwise agreed to by the complainant, registrant and the service
provider.
98. Ibid., para. 13.1 of the policy.
of a 3-member panel, but shall favour any panelist whom the parties have in
writing agreed to chair the panel.  Any disclosure concerning circumstances of
impartiality or independence of panelists must be made to the service provider.
For disclosures before appointment or even during a proceeding, the service
provider has the discretion to appoint a substitute panelist94.
The panel’s decision is communicated to the service provider, who must
within 3 days of receipt, communicate the full text of the decision to each party,
the relevant registrar and CIRA95.  The service provider must publish the full
decision on its Web site.  If the panel has ordered the complainant to pay any
amount to defray the registrant’s costs, the money is transferred to the service
provider to be held in trust for the registrant.  Finally, if a party initiates any
legal proceeding or arbitration during a proceeding in respect of the domain
name dispute, the service provider must be notified.  The service provider must
exercise its discretion to decide whether to stay or to terminate the proceeding
or to proceed to a decision96.
Court Intervention
A proceeding to resolve a domain name dispute under the CIRA policy
and rules is not a substitute to resolution by the courts, but rather an alternative.
Neither the policy nor the rules declares that a decision of a panel is final and
binding.  Nor do they mandate the proceeding as a compulsory first step in
resolving a dispute.  In fact, the policy explicitly states that the availability of a
proceeding pursuant to the policy does not prevent the registrant or the
complainant from submitting the dispute to a judicial or other administrative
forum97.  The only obligation upon a complainant or registrant during the course
of a proceeding is to give notice to the panel and service provider that it has
become party to a legal action98.  
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100. (2002), 60 O.R. (3d) 457; 115 A.C.W.S. (3d) 311 (O.S.C.J., Wright J.).
Despite this open invitation, few domain name disputes have been
resolved in the courts since the adoption of the ICANN and CIRA alternate
forums of dispute resolution.  The speed with which a dispute may be dealt with
has resulted in the resolution of thousands of cases in many countries99.  The
streamlined and managed procedure of this non-court forum, with less attention
to motions and delays, has been an attractive alternative.
However, the courts have a broader role than just the resolution of
disputes between parties. The courts provide a supervisory role by way of
judicial review of orders to check the excesses of government.  For example,
appeals of panel decisions under the policy can be heard by way of equitable
actions for declarations. The courts also provide a superintending role whereby
the validity of another court’s order or the order of an administrative body may
be challenged by collateral attack in some situations. These applications are few
in terms of the number of domain name disputes.  The first Canadian decision
dealing with a panel decision is that of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in
Black v. Molson Canada100.
Douglas Black had registered the domain name «www.canadian.biz».
He had secured the name through an online auction that was open to the general
public.  Mr. Black who had participated in the Canadian E-Business
Opportunities Roundtable was familiar with the potential of e-commerce and
had planned to use his domain name for a profit-seeking venture.  Molson
Canada demanded that he transfer the domain name to it because Molson’s had
a well-known beer called «Canadian» that was subject to a Canadian trade-mark.
Mr. Black responded by stating that he had no intention of using this generic
domain name in connection with beer or other Molson products.  Molson
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Resolution Policy, STOP carries a lower burden of proof.  Unlike the Uniform Dispute
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simply requires that the registrant registered the domain name in bad faith.  Supra note 57,
para. 3.1(c).
102. Molson Canada v. %2d%2d Claim No. FA0204000223451 at 4 (Robert R.  Merhige, Jr.,
Panelist).
103. Ibid. at 5.
admitted that the sole reason for claiming the domain name was its concern that
the name might be used inappropriately in the future.  
Molson Canada commenced a complaint against Mr. Black on April 26,
2002 in the National Arbitration Forum, which is a dispute resolution service
provider accredited by ICANN101.  A single panelist was appointed on May 30,
2002 and the panel’s decision of June 11, 2002 directed that the domain name
be transferred to Molson Canada.  The panel noted that the domain name was
identical to the mark in which the complainant had rights.  The panel also was
of the opinion that the assertions made by Mr. Black in relation to his planned
use of the domain name could «be characterized only as an unsupported, self-
serving allegation» that was insufficient to establish any rights or legitimate
interests102.  In addition, Mr. Black’s registration of the domain name 4 years
after Molson Canada’s registration of its trade-mark, and 50 years after its first
use constituted bad faith103.
Mr. Black applied to the Ontario Superior court of Justice for a
declaration that he was the owner of «www.canadian.biz».  The Court reviewed
the criteria used by the panel in arriving at its decision.  These criteria were the
elements required by the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy of ICANN to
obtain an order that the domain name be transferred.  The Court was of the
opinion that a domain name identical to a registered trade-mark in which a
complainant had rights should not be the end of the inquiry because the
registered trade-mark did not give Molson Canada exclusive use of the word
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note 100 at 315.
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«Canadian».  The trade-mark did protect the use only with respect to beer104.
The Court applied a subsequent American arbitration case that had refused to
order a transfer of the domain name «www.american.biz» because the word
«American» was geographically descriptive and therefore not capable of
protection by the trade-mark owner105.  The Court concluded that there was no
evidence of infringement of the use of the trade-mark name in this case and that
Mr. Black should be able to continue to use the domain name.
The Court did not agree with the panel that Mr. Black had not
established that he intended to use the domain name primarily for bona fide
business purposes.  The Court noted that one restriction of registering a «.biz»
domain name was that there must have been an existing use or intention to use
it for business purposes.  Further, due to the manner in which the domain name
had been auctioned off, it was unreasonable to expect that hopeful registrants
had spent a great deal of time developing business plans.  The Court also
disagreed with the finding of bad faith by the panel.  The Court noted that if the
panel was correct, then the only person who could have registered
«www.canadian.biz» without bad faith was Molson Canada.
Therefore, the Court declared that Mr. Black was the rightful registrant
of the domain name and that Molson Canada had no valid rights, title or interest
in «www.canadian.biz». 
The decision was brief and straightforward in its disagreement with the
panel’s conclusions.  However, the Court did not say why it exercised its
discretion to grant the declaration.  Mr. Black did not apply for judicial review
of the decision of the panel. Could the order of declaration be considered a
collateral attack on the panel’s decision?  If not, then would issue estoppel be
applicable in these circumstances?    Further, would Mr. Black have been
successful had he applied for judicial review of the panel’s decision?  
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Attack or Review by the Courts?
Decisions of panels under the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy
adopted by ICANN or the policy of CIRA do not originate from any statutory
source.  However, both the complainant and registrant have agreed to be bound
to the terms and conditions set out in the policy and the rules for the resolution
of a domain name dispute. The complainant voluntarily accepts this alternate
process at the time the complaint is launched106. The registrant agrees to submit
to any dispute relating to its domain name by a third party in the contract with
the registrar107.  This occurs at the time the domain name is registered. Thus, the
panel would be regarded as a consensual tribunal in administrative law.
Is the decision of a consensual panel amenable to review by the courts?
In the traditional common law, decisions of consensual tribunals were not
amenable to the prerogative remedies108.  These decisions were of a «domestic»
nature and not scrutinized as to their correctness by the courts.  On the other
hand, there is case law that has allowed the prerogative remedies to issue against
consensual bodies109.  Procedural reforms have made the statutory versus non-
statutory distinction less important in certain jurisdictions110.  Moreover, private
law remedies such as the declaration are not restricted to statutory proceedings
and now application for judicial review in certain jurisdictions can be used to
obtain traditional private law as well as prerogative remedies111.  In appropriate
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proceedings, then, panel decisions under the CIRA and ICANN policies should
normally be amenable to review by the courts.
Mr. Black sought a declaration that he was the rightful registrant of the
domain name and that Molson Canada had no rights to the domain name to
prevent his registration of it.  As Mr. Black did not ask for a judicial review of
the panel’s decision, the declaration was in essence a collateral attack on the
panel’s decision.  Unfortunately, the Court gave no reasons for exercising its
equitable jurisdiction the way it did.
Collateral Attack
Normally an order made by a court having jurisdiction to make it stands
and is binding unless it has been set aside on appeal or lawfully quashed112.   Nor
can such an order be attacked in proceedings other than those, whose specific
purpose has been to reverse, vary or nullify the order113.   The Supreme Court of
Canada has articulated factors to be considered when determining whether an
administrative order can be subject to a collateral attack114.   These factors
include the wording of the statute from which the power to issue the order is
derived, the purpose of the legislation, the availability of an appeal, the nature
of the collateral attack in relation to the expertise or purpose of the tribunal, the
penalty for failing to comply with the order and most importantly, the
legislature’s intention as to the appropriate forum115.   
Responses to several of these factors can be found in the policy of the
alternate dispute resolution process.  The purpose of a proceeding under the
policy is to provide a forum to deal inexpensively and expeditiously with a bad
faith registration of a domain name.  The policy articulates the considerations
to be taken into account to determine the basis of the complaint and the powers
Judicial Involvement
(2003-04) 34 R.D.U.S. in Domain Name Disputes 405
in Canada
116. The policy, para. 3.1 and 4.3.  The panel has power only to deny the complaint, or if the
panel decides in favour of the complainant, whether the registration should be cancelled or
transferred to the complainant.
117. The policy, para. 3.2 to 3.5 and 4.1.
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prevent either the Registrant or the Complainant from submitting a dispute between them to
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proceeding or other arbitration is initiated prior to or during a Proceeding in respect of a
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of the panel to issue specific orders116.  Definitions of key words for
consideration by the panel are stated and how evidence is to be weighted, on the
balance of probabilities, is also stated117.   However, no process of appeal, or
review, of the panel’s decision is provided in the policy.  While the lack of a
right to appeal a decision within the policy itself is an important factor in
considering a collateral attack, it should not be decisive.  
The question as to whether the court can determine the validity of the
panel’s decision on a collateral basis depends on whether the policy intended the
court as opposed to the panel to be the appropriate forum for making a final
decision.  The policy does state that the availability of a proceeding pursuant to
the policy does not prevent either the registrant or the complainant from
submitting the dispute between them to a judicial proceeding at any time for
independent resolution118.   However, the rules restrict the service provider’s
discretion to stay or terminate a Proceeding under the policy to when legal
proceedings have been commenced prior to or during a Proceeding.  The policy
does permit recourse to the courts when circumstances have mushroomed into
issues broader than bad faith registration under the policy.  Further, the
submissions of the parties may bring to light issues not covered by the policy,
thus recourse to the courts is not blocked by the existence of the policy itself. 
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There are other factors that must be considered to determine whether the
Court could use its equitable discretion to attack the panel’s decision.  The
parties had agreed to have their dispute resolved by the alternate resolution
process.  They had the option, as provided by the policy, to either commence
judicial proceedings to resolve their dispute or transfer it to the courts during the
dispute resolution Proceeding.  Neither party did so until after the panel’s
decision.  It would be contrary to the purpose of the policy to allow an attack on
the panel’s decision by a losing party.  Additional costs and extended time of
court action after a decision of the panel would undermine the policy.  The
credibility of the alternate dispute resolution process would be brought into
question despite the carefully drafted policy and finely balanced procedural
protections within the rules.  
Further, the conclusions that were attacked in the Court decision were
the very ones that the policy had mandated the panel to decide.  This is not a
case of the panel taking into account any extraneous or foreign considerations
in making its decision.  The Court did not question the validity of the policy
requirements that formed the basis of the complaint, but rather disagreed with
the panel’s conclusion based on the evidence.  The panel in Black v. Molson did
not consider any matter that would cause the panel to lose its jurisdiction.  Nor
did the Court state what would cause the panel to lose its jurisdiction through the
consideration of factors other than those specifically mandated by the policy.
The panel merely exercised the powers conferred upon it by the policy to which
the parties had agreed.
Finally, there are other reasons that should curtail any collateral attack
on the validity of the panel’s decision.  The policy does not purport to regulate
a certain sector of our society’s economy, such as regulations covering media,
health or the environment.  The policy resolves a relatively narrow band of
disputes relating to bad faith domain name registrations.  Black v. Molson is
neither a case of a concerned citizen who has brought the excesses of
government to the courts nor who has demonstrated any unlawfulness of state
action.  This case involves the determination of an economic right between two
parties, not the determination of a public interest right that carries a penal
sanction for contravention.  As such, one would question the efficiency of
expending judicial resources to allow the collateral attack and to undermine the
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administrative integrity of a private administrative tribunal in these
circumstances.
Application of Issue Estoppel
Closely related to the issue of collateral attack is the doctrine of issue
estoppel.  Issue estoppel provides that where there has been a final judicial
decision on an issue by an adjudicator of competent jurisdiction, the same
parties cannot re-litigate that issue119.    The purpose of the doctrine is to ensure
finality, to minimize wasteful litigation and to protect successful parties from
undue harassment from the losers120.    Judicial decisions should be conclusive
of issues decided unless and until reversed on appeal121.  In the administrative
context, issue estoppel helps protect tribunal advantages of speed, expertise and
informality against erosion by formal proceedings in ordinary courts122. 
There are three preconditions that must be met before issue estoppel may
be applied.  The question to be decided must be the same, the prior judicial
decision must have been final and the parties to the judicial decision must be the
same123.   A common element of these preconditions is that the decision of the
prior proceedings must have been judicial.  If these preconditions have been
successfully established, then the court must still determine whether, as a matter
of discretion, issue estoppel ought to be applied.
According to the criteria used by the Supreme Court in this context124,
the decision by a panel under the policy of the alternate dispute resolution
proceedings would likely be considered a judicial decision.  Under the policy,
the panel has been appointed to consider the evidence submitted by the parties
and to render a decision that is implemented by the service provider and the top
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level domain authority125.  The policy directs the panel as to what considerations
must be taken into account and how to weigh them.  The service provider
ensures that the provisions of the policy and rules have been complied with.
Specifically, the service provider ensures that both the complainant’s and
registrant’s submissions have been in compliance with the rules and policy.  Any
deficiencies must be brought to the attention of the complainant or registrant
within stated time frameworks to ensure compliance.  The panel is empowered
under the policy to make a decision that will determine who has right to the
domain name in question.  Thus the panel has an adjudicative function, not an
investigative one.
Have the three preconditions been met in Black v. Molson?   Mr. Black
sought a declaration that was based on the same facts and issues considered by
the panel126.  The same bases were used to prove Mr. Black was the rightful
registrant of the domain name as against Molson Canada.  Even though either
party to the proceeding under the policy had a right to transfer the dispute to the
courts either before or during the Proceeding, the panel’s decision was final
under the policy127.  Finally, the parties are the same in the Superior Court of
Justice as the Proceeding under the policy.  Thus, the preconditions have been
met and therefore, the decision of the panel could give rise to issue estoppel.
Should the Court have exercised its discretion to apply issue estoppel in
these circumstances?  The doctrine of issue estoppel is designed as an
implement of justice, and as a protection against an injustice.  The exercise of
the discretion is case specific and depends upon the circumstances.  The
discretion must respond to the realities of each case and the application of the
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doctrine must not result in an injustice128.  The discretion for issue estoppel is as
wide as under the rule against collateral attack.
In the circumstances of Black v. Molson Canada, it would have been
appropriate for the Superior Court of Justice to exercise its discretion in favour
of applying issue estoppel.  This is not a case wherein the panel’s decision had
been reached contrary to the principles of natural justice129.  Each party was
guided by the Service Provider to ensure compliance with the policy and rules.
This is not a case of any alleged error in carrying out the policy’s mandate.
Further, neither party exercised the right to transfer this dispute to the courts in
circumstances permitted by the policy.  Nor is this a case wherein one party
would suffer an injustice due to some «stubborn fact» if the court had exercised
its discretion to apply issue estoppel130.
What has occurred is an attack on the alternate dispute resolution
process itself and the undermining of a policy meant to be a relatively quick and
inexpensive means of resolving domain name disputes.  The parties had agreed
to the alternative dispute process and all its consequences.  The service provider
had ensured compliance with the governing documents.  The panel was not
comprised of lay persons but a legally trained retired judge who had experience
in the field131.   Further, Mr. Black, knowledgeable in the Internet and a self-
employed research consultant had not invested a great deal of time or money in
the contested domain name.  He had agreed to the dispute resolution process at
the time of registration of the domain name.  Further, there was no unusual fact
in existence to create a potential injustice in the circumstances.   
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of America (U.A.W.), Local 720 v. Volvo Canada Ltd., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 178.  With respect
to deference, Laskin C.J.C. at 184 stated, «The underlying principle in that respect has been
that the parties, having chosen to have their dispute determined without recourse to the
Courts, indeed, having contracted on that basis and being entitled to do so and to have their
Generally, no basis was stated by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
as to the exercise of its discretion to grant the declaration.  It is an error in
principle not to address the factors for and against the exercise of discretion that
the court clearly possesses132.   This default should be sufficient grounds for an
appellate court to intervene.  
Judicial Review
Mr. Black did not ask the court for a judicial review of the panel
decision.  Would he have been successful in such an application?  Upon what
grounds can a court review the decision of a consensual tribunal?  Because the
jurisdiction of a domestic tribunal is founded in contract, the terms of the
contract must be properly interpreted133.  Also, any discretion must be exercised
properly and the rules of natural justice must be observed134.  Therefore, the
courts may review errors made of consensual tribunals within their respective
jurisdictions as set out in the contract between the parties. On the other hand, the
courts will not interfere with a specific question of law that the parties have
agreed to have the consensual tribunal determine.  In short, the judicial review
of these decisions is comparable to the grounds of review of a decision by a
statutory body135.
Standard of Review
What standard of review should be applied to decisions made by
consensual tribunals if the test is the same as the review of a statutory
tribunal136?  The underlying principle is that the parties have chosen to have their
dispute determined in a forum other than the courts137.  The challenge, then, is
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Brokers), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557; Canada ( Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689;
University of British Columbia v. Berg, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 353; United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 579 v. Bradco Construction Ltd., [1993] 2
S.C.R. 316; Canada (Attorney General) v. Mossop, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554; National Grain
Growers Association v. Canada (Import Tribunal), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324; Union des
employes de service , Local 298 v. Bibeault, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048.
139. For a comprehensive review of the relationship between the traditional grounds and the
pragmatic functional approach, see, D.W. Elliott, Suresh and the Common Borders of
Administrative Law : Time for the Tailor? (2002), 65 Saskatchewan Law Review 469.
140. Ibid. at 480.
to distinguish matters that the parties intended to confer solely on the consensual
tribunal from matters that relate to jurisdiction.  As in statutory tribunals, the
Courts are reluctant to interfere with matters that the legislature intended to be
dealt with by the statutory delegate.  In consensual tribunals, the only difference
is that the source of the authority creating the decision-maker stems from
contract, not statute.
What is the standard of review applicable to statutory bodies?  In recent
years the Supreme Court of Canada has had considerable opportunity to discuss
this issue in several cases138.  Over time the Supreme Court has shifted the
application of the «nominate defects» test to the «pragmatic and functional»
approach for the purpose of judicial review139.   The former test includes the
traditional categories of bad faith, improper purpose, failing to consider relevant
factors or considering no evidence, to review either factual or discretionary
aspects of a decision.  However, this approach resulted in excessive judicial
interventionism, and as a result of calls for restraint, the Supreme Court has
shifted to the «pragmatic and functional» approach for substantive judicial
review140.
The approach that the Supreme Court of Canada now adopts is to weigh
the relevant functional factors to determine the appropriate standard of review
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144. Supra note 57, the policy, para. 3.  In 3.1(a), the policy defines the limits of the dispute and
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in specific circumstances.  Central to this inquiry is the legislative intent of the
statute creating the tribunal141.  Courts are to identify factors such as the
presence of any privative clause, the relative expertise of members of the
tribunal, the purpose and wording of the relevant statute and the nature of the
tribunal’s decision142.  No factor, by itself, will be dispositive, but will be an
indication of a level of deference to be shown to the decision in question. The
Courts are to weigh these factors to decide if review should occur at a minimal
level of patent unreasonableness, at a moderate level of reasonableness, or at a
high level of correctness.  
Application of Standard to Domain Name Decisions
The purpose of the policy of CIRA is to provide a forum to resolve
disputes of .ca domain names that have been registered in bad faith143. The goal
is to deal with disputes in an inexpensive but expeditious manner.  The policy
has been developed by experts in intellectual property and sets forth the terms
and conditions for resolution by arbitration. The rules under which this process
is to be governed have finely balanced the procedural rights of the complainant
and registrant.  The service provider administers the proceedings and ensures
that the rules are complied with in terms of content and procedure.  Both
complainant and registrant have agreed to be bound by the policy and rules.
Therefore, the intent of the policy and the rules is to provide a forum separate
from the courts to resolve domain name disputes that fall within the scope of the
policy144.
Under the policy the panel must determine whether the domain name in
question is confusingly similar to a mark in which the complainant had rights,
whether the registrant has a legitimate interest in the domain name and whether
the registrant has registered the domain name in bad faith.  This decision
determines the rights of the parties and is not a question of balancing
entitlements between different constituencies nor of managing any policy
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145. National Corn Growers, supra note 138.
146. Southam, supra note 138.
147. Supra note 57. Para. 3 of the policy states precisely what the meaning of «Mark», «Rights»,
and «Confusingly Similar» mean with respect to the basis for the complaint.   Further, para.
4 of the policy states that even if the complainant has proven the confusingly similar
requirement as well as bad faith registration, the registrant will still succeed if the registrant
proves, on the balance of probabilities, that the registrant had a legitimate interest in the
domain name.  The detailed meaning of «legitimate interest» and «bad faith registration» are
stated in para. 3.6 and 3.7 of the policy.
148. Southam, supra note 138.  In  Mossop, supra note 138 at 559, L’Heureux-Dube J. stated,
«In general, deference is given on questions of fact because of the “signal advantage”
enjoyed by the primary finder of fact.  Less deference is warranted on questions of law, in
part because the finder of fact may not have developed any particular familiarity with issues
of law.  While there is merit in the distinction between fact and law, the distinction is not
always so clear.  Specialized boards are often called upon to make difficult findings of both
fact and law.  In some circumstances, the two are inextricably linked».
149. Supra note 57.
development145.   The policy tests are not vague, open-textured nor do they
involve any «multi-factored balancing test» that would favour a lower standard
of review146.   However, the policy specifies the tests to be considered and
defines precisely their constituent elements and states how they are to be
weighed147.
Is the panel’s decision one of fact or law?  The courts are less deferential
of decisions that are determinations of law, but the line to be drawn between
questions of law and questions of fact is difficult to determine148.  The policy and
the rules leave little discretion to the panel.  The service provider ensures that
the complaint and the response are in compliance with the policy and the rules.
There is no in-person hearing nor contact with the parties by the panel.  The only
remedies available, denial of the complaint or cancellation or transfer of the
domain name, must be applied after evidence and argument found in the written
submissions by the parties have been made.  The decision must be made in
accordance with the policy and rules. The law to be considered is clearly
articulated in the policy and the panel is instructed as to what weight should be
given to the different tests149.  The decision of the panel is a tightly controlled
and considers a very narrow application of the law.
There is no privative clause in the policy.  Recourse to the dispute
resolution process under the policy does not prevent either party from submitting
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the dispute to a judicial or other administrative proceeding, arbitration,
mediation or other proceeding for independent resolution150.  The presence of a
privative clause is normally compelling evidence that the court ought to show
deference to a tribunal’s decision, but the absence of a privative clause does not
necessarily imply a high standard of scrutiny151.   Other factors that may indicate
the contrary have to be considered.  In terms of the policy, the fact that alternate
proceedings are so openly available to either party, should not undermine the
true intention of policy and parties themselves, namely, to have a conclusive
determination of a dispute expeditiously and inexpensively.  Otherwise, an
aggrieved party with substantial resources could always have recourse to the
courts after a decision of the panel.  This would result in greater expenditure of
resources, extension of time before final resolution and militate against the
purpose the policy and original intention of the parties.  Thus the absence of a
privative clause should not be weighted heavily in determining the standard of
review.
The most important factor in settling the standard of review is expertise.
As Bastarache J. stated in Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), «If a tribunal has been constituted with a particular expertise with
respect to achieving the aims of an Act, whether because of the specialized
knowledge of its decision-makers, special procedure, or non-judicial means of
implementing the Act, then a greater degree of deference will be accorded»152.
Further, expertise is to be considered a relative concept, not an absolute one.
The evaluation of relative expertise has three dimensions153.  First, the court
must have regard to the expertise of the tribunal in question.  Second, the court
must consider its own expertise relative to the tribunal and finally, the nature of
the specific issue before the administrative decision-maker relative to this
expertise.  A decision that involves application of a highly specialized expertise
should result in a lower standard of review and will favour a higher degree of
deference.
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154. For Resolution Canada Inc., one of the CIRA service providers, see
«http://www2.resolutioncanada.ca/content/list-adjudicators.php» and for the other service
provider, British Columbia International Commercial Arbitration Centre, see,
«http ://www.bcicac.ca/cfm/index.cfm?L=70&P=126».  For the National Arbitration Forum,
see «http://www.arbitration-forum.com/about/questions.asp#18», wherein mostly retired
judges are selected.
With respect to the alternate dispute resolution process set up originally
up under WIPO supervision and then CIRA, relative expertise takes on new
meaning at three levels. First, the policy and rules were promulgated only after
serious consideration by experts in the areas of intellectual property and trade-
marks. The policy sets out in detail the disputes to which it applies as well as the
requirements of proof.  The tests to determine whether the domain name in
question infringes a registered trade-mark are spelled out and key words have
expansive definitions.  These tests represent years of case law development and
international consensus.  The rules carefully articulate a balanced procedure to
preserve the rights between the complainant and respondent and the relation of
them to the service provider and the panel.
The service providers who must be accredited by CIRA are central to the
administration of the proceeding for .ca domain name disputes.  The service
providers are also experts in the administration of trade-marks and intellectual
property.  Their responsibilities extend beyond mere process administration.
Under the rules, service providers must ensure that the complaint and response
are in compliance with the policy and rules.  Even though the service provider
has no authority to decide matters of a substantive nature, any deficiencies in the
complaint or response must be brought into compliance to the service provider’s
satisfaction.  The service provider also sets the standards for appointment of
panelists to the service provider’s list.  The service provider also has the
discretion to appoint a new panelist in the event the issue of impartiality or
independence arises and who to appoint to a panel in the event that neither party
can agree.  
The persons on the list of panelists of the two providers in Canada are
not lay persons, but all experts in the area of intellectual property and trade-
marks.  All are lawyers, law professors or retired judges154.  To be placed on the
list, panel members must have the confidence of the provider as to integrity and
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155. For general guideline for selection of panelists for BCICAC, see,
«http ://www.bcicac.ca/cfm/index.cfm?L=1&P=70»  and for the National Arbitration Forum,
see, «http://www.arbitration-forum.com/about/questions.asp#18».
156. See WIPO, The Management of Internet Names and Addresses : Intellectual Property
Issues : Final Reporter of the WIPO Internet Domain Name Process 139, 150(iv), at
«http://wipo2.wipo.int/process1/report/finalreport.html» (April 30, 1999).
American cases wherein  the courts have not felt bound by the outcome of administrative
proceedings include Weber-Stephen Products Co. v. Armitage Hardware and Building
Supply, Inc. (2000), 54 U.S.P.2D(BNA) 1766, Referee Enterprises, Inc. v. Planet Ref, Inc.,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9303, Dan Parisi v. Netlearning, Inc. 2001 139 F. Supp. 2d 745,
Registral.com, LLC v. Fisher Controls International, Inc. 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10002,
Strick Corporation v. James B. Strickland 2001 162 F. Supp. 2d 372, Lawrence Storey v.
Cello Holdings, LLC. 2002 182 F. Supp. 2d 355, Eurotech, Inc. v. Cosmos European
Travels Aktiengesellshaft 2002 189 F. Supp. 2d 385, Barcelona.com v. Excelentisimo
Ayuntamiento De Barcelona 2002 189 F. Supp. 2d 367. See also, D. E. Sorkin Judicial
ability and have demonstrated skills and competence as arbitrators155.  A profile
of each member on the list is available on the provider’s web-site.  The panelists
apply a highly specialized expertise and as a result, a high degree of deference
should be accorded to the decision of the panel.     
When all these factors are weighed together, what should the appropriate
standard of review be for a panel’s decision?  The expertise employed to arrive
at a decision is high and should be a major factor in favour of a low standard of
review.  The articulation of legal tests in the policy together with the mandated
weighing of these tests should also favour deference because the question to be
addressed by the panel is not one of law, but whether the submissions of the
parties have met the tests of the policy.  Also the intention of the parties to have
a domain name dispute conducted outside the realm of the court by a highly
sophisticated procedure should also be a consideration that militates against a
high standard of review.  On the other hand, the lack of a privative clause could
be a factor that would prompt judicial review.
Black v. Molson Revisited
It could be argued that the domain name dispute resolution policy under
UDRP or CIRA was never intended to replace litigation, but was intended to
ensure that the parties could seek independent judicial resolution of a dispute,
regardless of whether its proceeding reached a conclusion156.    Recourse to the
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157. Dluhos v. Strasberg 2003 321 F. 3d 365. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that a decision of a domain name panel did not qualify as an «arbitration» under the
American Federal Arbitration Act 9 U.S.C.S. 10(a)(2)-10(a)(3).  As a result, the dispute
resolution panel decision was not entitled to an «extremely deferential» review in the federal
courts.
158. See, Canada (Attorney General) v. Mossop, supra note 138 and Douglas Aiarcraft Company
of Canada Ltd. v. McConnell, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 245.
159. Pushpanathan, supra note 138.
160. Danyluk v. Ainsworth Techonologies Inc., supra note 119.
161. P.D. Kelly, Emerging Patterns in Arbitration Under the Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy (2002), 17 Berkley Tech. L.J. 181.
162. J.J. McMurray Policy Considerations From a Practitioner’s Perspective : The UDRP v.
Traditional Litigation : May the Best Process Win (2001), 20 St. Louis Pub. L. Rev. 379.
courts would serve as an integral quality control mechanism in the system and
protect it against faulty decisions.   Further, because the dispute would not
necessarily be settled by the proceedings under the policy, no deference to a
panel decision need be given in judicial review157.
 On the other hand, judicial review could also be viewed as a mechanism
of controlling and supervising decisions of administrative bodies, with or
without the existence of a privative clause158.   Canadian Courts have taken an
approach wherein several considerations are weighed, with no one factor
necessarily being conclusive when determining what level of deference ought
to be given to the decision of an administrative body159.    Nor have the Courts
allowed administrative law doctrines to preclude review of a decision that has
resulted in an injustice160.
Reform of the domain name dispute resolution policy as a system has
become a factor, not necessarily for judicial review, but for the legitimacy of the
process itself.  Language in the policy that gives trade-mark owners an
advantage over domain name owners161, the lack of an internal appellate process
and the inability to deal with multiple legitimate claimants to a single domain
name have been suggested areas of reform162.  Other suggestions for procedural
reform relate to bias in the complainant’s rate of success that has resulted in
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163. M. Mueller Rough Justice : An Analysis of ICANN’s Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy
(November 3, 2000), at «http://www.digital-convergance.org» and M. Geist Fair.com? : An
Examination of Allegations of Systematic Unfairness in the ICANN UDRP (August 18,
2001), at «http://aixl.uottawa.ca/<diff>geist/geistudrp.pdf». Professor Mueller has
recommended random selection of panelists as well as the creation of an appeal process.
Professor Geist has recommended three member panelists, caseload minimums and
maximums of panelists as well as new quality controls to review panelists’ performance.  See
supra note 57, para. 5 of the CIRA rules.
164. D. Armon Is This as Good as It Gets? An Appraisal of ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy Three Years After Implementation (2003), 22 Rev. Litig. 99.
165. Or the complaint could be denied.
166. See supra note 99.
forum shopping163.  A Review Board that could identify cases to be identified as
creating binding precedents has also been suggested164.  The Review Board
would provide greater predictability, help in eliminating bias and strengthen the
legitimacy of the process itself.
In light of the above, was Black v. Molson correctly decided?  The
answer to this question will have to be decided by an appeal court in the future.
The Court simply disagreed with the conclusions of the panel with regard to the
tests set down in the policy and was of the opinion that there had to be evidence
that the domain name infringed the use of the trade-mark name.  However, the
tests set down in the policy are not meant to determine infringement but rather
whether a particular domain name should be either cancelled or transferred, after
the tests, individually and collectively, have been applied to the submissions165.
  
A collateral attack on the decision of the panel is hard to support
according to the tests laid down by the Supreme Court of Canada.  In principle,
the application of issue estoppel would have been a more appropriate exercise
of the Court’s discretion.  Further, the Court failed to consider the factors for and
against its intervention. This omission, by itself, should be grounds of appeal.
Conclusion
Resort to the courts for the resolution of domain name disputes has
virtually ceased since the adoption of the alternate forum of ICANN and CIRA.
Since their adoption literally thousands of cases have been heard and decided166.
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167. The policy was originally intended to catch only «abusive registrations» made with the bad
faith intent to profit commercially from others’ trade-marks.  All other disputes must be
resolved in the courts.  See., ICANN, Second Staff Report on Implementing Documents for
the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (Oct. 25, 1999), at «http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-
second-staff-report-24oct99.htm».
168. D. E. Sorkin, Judicial Review of ICANN Domain Name Dispute Decisions, 18 Computer &
High Tech. L.J. 35 at 47.
169. For potential bias of selection of service providers and appointment of panelists, see M.
Geist at «http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~geist/frameset.htm».
Expeditious resolution provides an advantage not found in the courts.  In
addition, the tightly controlled rules of case management and simplicity of
remedial action provide a comfort level for litigants not found with resolution
in the courts.  Delays by way of procedural motion or demands for further
particulars are not available in the alternate dispute resolution process.  Finally,
recourse to the expedited process should be more cost effective.
However, the application of the policy is limited to complaints within
its relatively narrow scope, namely, claims involving abusive registrations made
with the intent to profit commercially from another’s trade-mark167.  Fortunately,
the requirements for basing a complaint are clearly articulated and key words
have expansive definitions within the policy itself.  Anything outside this scope
must be resolved through the courts.  This would include actions that involve
claims involving contract law, fraud, privacy, personality rights, free speech,
copyright, fiduciary duties as well as claims involving trade-mark rights beyond
the scope of the policy168. 
De novo judicial review may be consistent with the intent of the policy
because the policy itself contemplates that the parties may initiate parallel legal
proceedings.  No doubt the quick streamlining of cases through the procedure
sacrifices some degree of reliability and validity.  Thus this trade-off may be
defeated if the courts were to defer to the decisions of panels.  Also, panel
decisions based on default cases and decided by sole panelists may set bad
precedent thus debasing the value of consistency and predictability. The courts
by way of de novo review may be able to address the perceived bias of panelists
or service providers to maintain public confidence169.  Finally, any imbalance in
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170. For example, a losing trade-mark owner can seek a legal remedy at leisure, whereas the
losing domain name registrant has only 60 days to prepare and file a court challenge to
prevent the immediate loss of the domain name (Policy, para. 4.5).  This legal challenge may
possibly be in a foreign jurisdiction.
the rules between the rights of the trade-mark owner and the registrant can only
be resolved by a de novo review of a panel’s decision170. 
On the other hand, absent any of the above concerns, the court ought to
discuss the basis of the collateral attack, the reasons for exercising discretion for
applying issue estoppel and – in the event of judicial review - the standard of
review of a panel’s decision.  These are relevant factors dictated by the Supreme
Court of Canada.  In Black v. Molson the court simply reviewed the panel’s
decision and disagreed with the result.  Reasons were not stated to justify the
exercise of discretion nor was there any discussion as to a possible level of
deference to the panel’s decision.  The balance among deference, discretion and
the standard of review might well be difficult to assess for domain name
decisions under the alternate dispute resolution process and might well vary
from case to case, but it is an exercise that ought to be articulated.
